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U.S. Administration's Nonproliferation Perspectives and Goals

Introduction

Thank you, Mr. Gun, for your introduction and thank you, Ambassador Bayer, for your warm welcome to Turkey and for Turkey's strong leadership in the area of nonproliferation. I would also like to thank all the officials from the Turkish government who are here today and particularly, those who have worked on the preparations for this conference.

Your efforts underscore the value of multilateral partnership, implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (and as Ambassador Bayer mentioned, UNSCR 1874) commitments, and engagement in combating the serious threats to international security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Your successful effort to stand up an action-oriented task force to deal with the multifaceted proliferation challenge provides a strong example of effective interagency cooperation.

Turkey's co-hosting of this conference is an indication of its commitment to effective export controls and highlights the importance of a regional approach to export control cooperation. Our co-hosting of this conference also reflects the strong bilateral partnership with Turkey in the area of nonproliferation.

Appreciation of Export Control Professionals

It is a pleasure to be here and welcome you as delegates to the 10th International Export Control Conference, co-hosted by the Governments of Turkey and the United States, and sponsored by the Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security – or EXBS – program.

The United States has sponsored international export control programs that have expanded and evolved since the 1990s, and we recognize that strategic trade controls are a critical component of international security. As the threat of developing or proliferating WMD continues to grow, your efforts on strategic trade

controls become more and more important. Indeed, preventing the proliferation of WMD and their related technologies is one of our most pressing security challenges.

Keeping these weapons out of the hands of irresponsible regimes and terrorist groups and their supporters is an increasing challenge that is complicated by globalization and the continued emergence of new technologies. No nation is served by a nuclear arms race or terrorists acquiring WMD; therefore, all nations have a shared interest in combating these threats.

As export control professionals, you are on the frontline of implementing critical regulations and developing new ideas in nonproliferation. As an international community, we are dedicated to a common mission to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and to preventing destabilizing accumulations of advanced conventional weapons and the transfer of such weapons to terrorists or countries of concern.

We come as delegates to conferences such as these because we recognize the importance in fostering an ongoing exchange of information, building international partnerships, and sharing expertise and best practices. I hope that this conference will create and reinforce this strong network of export control practitioners.

New Administration, New Approaches

In Prague earlier this year, President Obama outlined a bold vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world. That the President chose to focus on this issue during his first extended official visit abroad is significant and underlines a renewed focus on intensifying strategic arms control efforts. On a daunting agenda of foreign and domestic policy issues, President Obama notably identifies nonproliferation as “one of our highest priorities.” The President recognizes that this agenda cannot be executed hastily, but he defined specific approaches we can take to move in the right direction.

As part of his agenda, President Obama has declared his intent to:

- Work closely with the U.S. Senate to receive its advice and consent for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);

- Pursue a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons;
- Seek deep, verifiable reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and the participation of all nuclear weapon states in follow-on reduction efforts. Our negotiations with the Russians have already begun to bear fruit;
- Strengthen compliance with existing obligations. To paraphrase President Obama, rules must be binding and violators must be held accountable. When nations break the rules, they will face consequences. The President calls upon all Parties to recommit to the NPT's principles and strengthen its enforcement mechanisms.
- Build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including multilateral nuclear fuel supply assurances, to expand nuclear power peacefully without increasing the risks of proliferation.
- Strengthening and expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) and turn them into durable international institutions to ensure they remain effective tools in helping responsible governments cooperate to stop the proliferation of WMD.

This is a bold and ambitious agenda and we will need robust international partnership engagement in order to achieve it in the coming years. We, in the United States, realize that an integral element of our call for international partnership is demonstrating our own commitment through actions, not just words; we are challenged by our own obligations to improving international security, we aim for greater coherence in making our programs work better together in a collaborative, interagency manner, and we seek a cooperative, multilateral approach in building international partnerships.

It is essential that the United States engages actively on the issue of nonproliferation, not just on the level of foreign minister to foreign minister, but also on the working level. We also recognize the need to bring into the multilateral discussion all relevant partners, such as the Departments of Justice, Energy, Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, as well as industry, and nongovernmental organizations.

U.S. strategic arms control strategy is built on the three pillars of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: arms control and disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear cooperation and security. Without question, effective export controls and comprehensive border security are keys to the nonproliferation pillar.

In the United States, we are proud of our stringent licensing requirements, state of the art equipment, and most importantly, a professional enforcement-oriented customs and borders protection force. However, maintaining control of our borders and monitoring the movements of strategic and dual-use items remains a work in progress. For each of us, no doubt, the story is pretty much the same. To successfully counter the threat of WMD, we must continue to improve and update our capabilities.

Continuing Threats

President Obama also noted in his Prague speech that the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired nuclear weapons, testing has continued, black market trade of nuclear knowledge and materials thrives, and terrorists are determined to acquire the capability for a nuclear attack. I want to emphasize, however, the President believes that every state has the right to the benefits derived from the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the NPT, but he also believes that with this right comes the responsibility to ensure that the technology is not diverted for non-peaceful uses.

We are concerned that Iran has not complied with the demands of multiple UN Security Council resolutions to suspend its enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities, and that its government also refuses to provide requested access or transparency to the IAEA to build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

The President has made it clear that in order for Iran to regain a respectable place in the international community, among other things, Iran must play a responsible role by fulfilling its NPT, IAEA and UN Security Council obligations. The President has also made it clear that we intend to engage Iran directly on the basis of mutual interests and respect. In the meantime, we will continue to reinforce the P5+1 dual track strategy, as concerns over Iran's nuclear program are not only American concerns, they are international. The United States and our partners will be watching closely for an indication that Iran shares the goal of a diplomatic

resolution to the nuclear issue, particularly Iran's response to the April 2009 P5+1 offer to meet and discuss our respective views.

The case of North Korea highlights the dangers of noncompliance with the NPT and the threat such behavior brings to international peace and security. We remain committed to a peaceful resolution to this challenge, and to the realization of the goals articulated in the 2005 Joint Statement, in which North Korea committed to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return at an early date to NPT and IAEA safeguards. We will continue to work with allies and partners in the United Nations Security Council and in the Six-Party Talks with verified denuclearization as the objective.

Additionally, we face threats from non-state actors. We live in an age where the perils of terrorism are increasing, not decreasing. We must stay alert and work together on the full range of disciplines to combat nuclear terrorism. While there may not be a single, universal solution to preventing nuclear terrorism -- as was clear at the GI Hague Meeting that I attended -- the notion of "best practices" teaches us that a successful approach in one country can be applied to others who may be facing similar threats.

New Themes and Actors

This year's Export Control Conference highlights some new themes in export control cooperation discussion. Regional cooperation, government-industry outreach, and investigations and prosecution are some of the subjects we will be talking about in the next few days, and I urge each of you to look for ways to incorporate these ideas into your work to combat proliferation and foster international partnership.

For example, global cooperation can often be fostered by regional partnerships. Regional partnerships can lead to greater efficiency for all involved. NGOs can also be instrumental in assisting with regional models of partnership, and we are pleased to welcome several NGO representatives to the conference today to join our discussions.

With respect to government-to-industry outreach, we often see national government entities working closely with domestic industries to develop internal controls. Private industry also understands their obligation to police themselves, and in doing so, they become partners in export control efforts. As more companies -- not just large ones, but small and medium sized enterprises -- are

spanning countries and regions, it is valuable for governments and industry to have a forum such as this conference to discuss new challenges and to share industry best practices.

And lastly, we'll discuss the latest global law enforcement efforts to eliminate proliferation financing and tracking down proliferators' networks. In this, as in any other global effort, there is a need to share information, technology, best practices, and to work together.

Conclusions

Once again, thank you all for your commitment to improving our individual and collective abilities to use export controls and border security to prevent, detect, and if necessary, respond to the proliferation of WMD. I wish you a successful and productive conference. I hope it will contribute to an enhanced dialogue and most importantly, concrete actions. As always, we welcome suggestions for any additional coordination or assistance the U.S. may provide.